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Established in 1966, the Assembly
Office of Research (AOR) brings
together legislators, scholars, research
experts and interested parties from within and outside the legislature to conduct
extensive studies regarding problems
facing the state.
Under the director of the Assembly's
bipartisan Committee on Policy
Research, AOR investigates current sate
issues and publishes reports which
include long-term policy recommendations. Such investigative projects often
result in legislative action, usually in the
form of bills.
AOR also processes research
requests from Assemblymembers.
Results of these short-term research projects are confidential unless the requesting legislators authorize their release.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Mortgaging the Thrift Industry: A
History of Savings and Loans (February
1990). This AOR report discusses the
historical development of the thrift
industry in the United States, emphasizing California's state-chartered savings
and loans during the late 1970s and the
1980s; highlights the findings of federal
and state regulators who examined
insolvent savings and loan associations
from the mid-1980s to the present; and
offers policy options and recommendations to assist state legislators and other
interested parties in addressing
California's thrift problems.
According to the report, during the
nineteenth century, the public's desire
for institutions to finance home mortgages and provide safe depositories for
personal savings led to the establishment of cooperative savings societies
and mutual savings banks, the forerunners of today's savings and loan, or
thrift, industry. There was no government support or supervision for these
early savings and loans for more than a
century. However, a number of unsound
"national" savings and loans were
formed in the late 1880s and early
1890s, leading to the creation of an
industry organization to set standards.
That organization is now known as the
United States League of Savings
Institutions. By 1928, some states had
begun to regulate their savings and
loans, resulting in an industry governed
by a hodgepodge of state regulations.
Following the market crash of 1928
and the general economic collapse that
followed, savings and loans found them-

selves with massive holdings of repossessed devalued property. Depositors
lost faith in the system, and there were
runs on both savings and loan associations and banks. Because there was no
deposit insurance to protect savers and
no system of home loan banks to provide emergency liquidity to thrifts, more
than 1,700 failed, and depositors lost
more than $200 million.
Congress responded by approving
three major acts: the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act of 1932, the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1934, and the
National Housing Act of 1934. Each of
these acts was aimed at resuscitating the
thrift industry, and each resulted in closer regulation of that industry.
During the period from 1947-60,
total assets of the savings and loan
industry grew from $10 billion to more
than $60 billion. Interest rates paid to
savings depositors in this post-war era
were low, generally 2-2.5%, and mortgage interest was 5-5.5% and stable. In
the 1960s, the industry experienced
increased competition, higher interest
rates, and declining earnings or return
on assets. The 1970s brought inflation,
as well as a significant increase in the
number of rules governing savings and
loan lending practices.
In California, perhaps the landmark
action of the 1970s affecting the thrift
industry was the 1978 state Supreme
Court decision in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America. The court held that private
lenders in California could not use "dueon-sale" clauses in loan agreements to
prevent purchasers of residential real
estate from assuming mortgages at old,
low interest rates. The thrift industry
complained that the decision bound
them to old mortgages yielding 8-9%
interest while the national prime lending
rate was at its highest level in history.
By the early 1980s, savings and loans
had to pay depositors 16% or more to
keep their money flowing into the industry.
In 1982, the United States Supreme
Court held that Wellenkamp did not
apply to federally-chartered thrifts. Later
that same year, Congress gave both
state-chartered financial institutions and
private individuals the authority to
enforce due-on-sale clauses. However,
between 1978 and 1982, several hundred savings and loan institutions went
out of business or merged with other
institutions because they were caught in
the interest rate squeeze.
Congress attempted to respond to this
situation by passing the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980. The Act (1) provided authority for all thrifts and
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commercial banks to offer interest-bearing checking accounts; (2) allowed
state-chartered thrifts to convert to federal charters; (3) raised the federal
deposit insurance from $40,000 per
account per person or legal entity to
$100,000; and (4) eliminated the ceilings on interest rates that thrifts could
pay depositors on various types of
accounts. Acting on this last grant of
authority, many thrifts paid depositors
higher interest rates to keep them from
withdrawing their savings to invest in
more attractive financial instruments.
However, because many of these thrifts
were still locked into long-term, fixed
rate mortgage loans that provided the
thrifts with less income than they needed to pay depositors, almost 500 thrifts
failed across the country between 1980
and 1983.
A variety of congressional acts during the early 1980s resulted in the substantial deregulation of federal-chartered
thrifts. As a result, large numbers of
California's state-chartered thrifts began
converting to federal charters. To stem
the tide of such conversions, the
California League of Savings Institutions, then the California Savings and
Loan League, asked for legislative
action. In 1982, the state legislature
removed most investment restrictions on
state-chartered thrifts.
The new investment powers and
deregulation measures at both the federal and state levels had an immediate
impact on the industry nationwide, and
they proved to be a very mixed blessing.
Thrifts using the new powers prospered
if they employed experienced managers
familiar with the risks and benefits of
commercial real estate lending, investment in commercial and residential
property, equity securities, consumer
loans, and a variety of financial instruments available in the secondary market.
But the thrifts with inexperienced or
shortsighted managers who did not
understand either the inherent risks or
the sophisticated and often high-risk
devices used to hedge against those risks
did not fare well.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, California began to stiffen its regulatory
authority over savings and loans, and
rigorous new financial standards have
recently been imposed by federal legislation. However, serious damage has
already occurred. By January 1989, an
estimated 500 of the nation's 3,000 savings and loans were considered insolvent. The Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation's (FSLIC) insurance fund went broke in 1986 bailing
out these insolvent thrifts.
In August 1989, the Financial
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Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enhancement Act (FIRREA) was enacted to re-fund the insolvent FSLIC. This
legislation also raises capital requirements, gives federal regulators broader
authority over state-chartered thrifts,
and restricts direct real estate and equity
investments by the state-chartered portion of the industry. (See CRLR Vol. 9,
No. 4 (Fall 1989) pp. 99-100 for background information.)
AOR's report noted that the most
common problems facing insolvent or
poorly capitalized savings and loan
institutions today can be placed into the
following categories: (1) bad loans; (2)
overreliance on volatile funding in the
form of large brokered deposits; (3)
insider abuse and fraud; (4) failure of
management to correct problems identified by the regulators; and (5) poor
recordkeeping that often masks risky
deals.
In response to these problems and in
light of current re-regulation of the
industry, AOR made the following recommendations:
-the state legislature should set loanto-value ratios for real estate loans
secured by unimproved real property;
-the state legislature should amend
existing law to require a thrift to inspect
any property for which a savings and
loan institution proposes to originate a
loan of $1 million or more;
-the legislature should amend the
California Financial Code to restrict
transactions among savings and loans,
their holding companies, subsidiaries,
and affiliates;
-the California Savings and Loan
Commissioner should be required to
report by March 1, 1991, on whether the
FIRREA's exceptions to national bank
lending restrictions provide adequate
protections to state-chartered savings
and loan depositors and shareholders;
-the legislature should restrict the use
of brokered deposits by state-chartered
savings and loans; and
-the legislature should reinstate a
multiple stockholder requirement for
new state-chartered savings and loans in
California, together with a share percentage limit for any single stockholder.
Return of the Medfly: The Battles
Continues (March 1990). According to
this AOR report, in the early 1980s, the
crop-destroying Mediterranean fruit fly
(Medfly) caused a major infestation in
northern California, particularly in
Santa Clara County. In response, the
California Department of Food and
Agriculture (CDFA) attacked the pest
with limited pesticide applications from
the ground, removal of potentially
infested backyard fruit, and release of

millions of sterile Medflies. Despite
such efforts, the infestation worsened.
Aerial spraying of the infested area with
the pesticide malathion began in July
1981 and was completed in September
1982. About 900,000 acres in 44 cities
within 8 counties were sprayed with
malathion. The cost of the 1981-82
Medfly eradication program was
approximately $96 million.
According to the report, CDFA
acknowledges that the state found at
least one Medfly every year after this
major infestation, except in 1983 and
1985. In 1987, 44 adult Medflies were
found in Los Angeles County, compared
to 4 adult Medflies found in the same
county in 1980. Because of the increasing number of Medflies discovered
within the state during the late 1980s,
the report criticized CDFA for not
responding more quickly to address and
prevent the potentially serious problem
of reinfestation.
Since mid-1989, and possibly due to
CDFA's inaction, the state has been
fighting another Medfly war, this time in
southern California. (See CRLR Vol. 10,
No. 1 (Winter 1990) pp. 118-19 for
background information.) During the
summer of 1989, CDFA captured 40
Medflies in the Los Angeles area. In
August, CDFA applied a single aerial
spraying of malathion to the area and,
several days later, released sterile
Medflies. In September, CDFA claimed
that eradication was complete.
However, since that time, 249 adult
Medflies and an unknown number of
Medfly larvae at 27 sites have been captured in 45 cities in southern California.
Aerial spraying of malathion has escalated to an area in excess of 500 square
miles in southern California.
Following the first infestation, thenGovernor Edmund Brown established a
Pest Response Task Force, to ensure that
critical lessons learned during the 198082 Medfly infestation were not forgotten
and to guarantee prompt control of
future emergency pest problems. The
task force recommended that California's defense lines be strengthened, that
exclusion and prevention be an ongoing
priority, and that a systematic and ongoing program of research support be
established to aid in the battle.
According to AOR, however,
Californians may not have learned this
lesson. Research projects to fill Medfly
biology and ecology data gaps are not
being funded. CDFA has failed to fund
important Medfly research projects.
Instead of heeding the task force recommendations, CDFA appears to focus
funding on research to build a better
Medfly trap or to better eradicate the

Medfly once it is found in the state. A
review of CDFA budget data for the
period 1980-81 through 1990-91 reveals
that eradication programs have received
far more resources than prevention programs, receiving funding approximately
225-650% higher than prevention programs.
According to AOR, an emphasis on
prevention programs over eradication
programs would alleviate the adverse
effects that many eradication pesticides
cause. Malathion, for example, may produce the following reactions in humans:
skin rashes, irritation of the eyes, nose,
or throat, or a flare-up of asthma in
known asthmatics.
AOR recommends that California
reorganize existing governmental
research activities and abolish the
existing Medfly/exotic pest Science
Advisory Panel within CDFA, and that
the legislature create an independent
Institute for Exotic Pest Research. In
conjunction with the creation of this
Institute, the legislature should do the
following:
-set a research agenda which focuses
on prevention, but not to the exclusion
of exploring better methods of
eradication as well;
-appropriate all state funds currently
appropriated to CDFA and the
University of California for exotic pestrelated research to the Institute for
research projects;
-provide advice to CDFA, county
agricultural commissioners, and farmers
regarding exotic pest prevention and
detection activities; and
-direct the Institute to prepare regularly scheduled reports to the Governor
and the legislature on the status of statefunded exotic pest research efforts.
A Closer Look At The Doggie In The
Window: A Survey of Pet Stores and
Veterinarians in California(April 1990)
presents statistical information regarding the number and origin of puppies
transported into California for sale by
pet stores, as well as information regarding those pet shop puppies in need of
medical attention following purchase.
Bills introduced during recent legislative
sessions have attempted to place controls on the interstate shipment of puppies into California. Debate on these
bills has focused on the conditions under
which puppies are bred and transported
to California, and the resultant incidence
of allegedly sick and genetically defective puppies being sold by pet stores.
In preparing this report, AOR sent
questionnaires to 1,252 veterinarians in
26 cities, as well as 268 pet stores in
those same cities. However, only 175
valid veterinarian surveys were returned
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to AOR, and only 54 pet stores served
as the pet store data base. Also, district
attorneys representing each of the 26
cities, humane societies, and better business bureaus were contacted and asked
to enumerate complaints they had
received or actions they had taken related to pet stores selling sick puppies.
Results of the surveys include the
following:
-Veterinarians responding to the
questionnaire indicated that during
1988, 8,988 pet store puppies received
treatment after purchase.
-The most common ailments among
pet store-purchased puppies were upper
respiratory disease and gastrointestinal
parasitism.
-Of the puppies treated, 48.6% were
identified as incubating a disease or sick
at the time of purchase.
-Over half (52%) of the puppies
treated incurred $50-$150 in treatment
costs, and 26.7% of the puppies treated
incurred $151-$300 in treatment costs.
-Although 51 of the 54 pet stores
responding indicated that puppies were
sold under warranty, approximately 39%
of veterinarians responding to the survey noted that none of the costs for
treating pet store purchased puppies
were covered by warranties from pet
stores.
-Puppies from out of state accounted
for the single largest source of sick puppies-4,046 (45%) of the 8,988 sick
puppies treated for illness by veterinarians.
-The pet shops surveyed noted that
69.8% of puppies sold are acquired from
out-of-state breeders.
California Children, California
Families: Educating Minority Students
in California (April 1990) addresses
ways in which California can reform
and/or restructure its educational system
to respond more effectively to the needs
of its minority students. The report
develops an academic profile of those
schools principally serving minority students, examines factors contributing to
the differences in achievement between
low- and high-performing schools,
addresses issues of resource allocation,
and makes several policy recommendations for addressing some of the more
critical issues highlighted by the study.
The report noted that gains have been
made in the achievement of black and
Hispanic students since the implementation of various educational reform
efforts five years ago. However, there
continues to be a persistent and significant gap between the performance of
white and Asian students and the performance of black and Hispanic students in
California public schools. The differ-
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ences are extremely acute when comparing the performance of schools serving
predominantly black and/or Hispanic
students with schools serving predominantly white students.
Also, schools serving high percentages of black and Hispanic students
have significantly larger average enrollments than schools serving high percentages of white students. This is particularly true for Hispanic students at all
grade levels.
AOR noted that current statewide
practice requires that fiscal data be collected using the school district as the
unit of analysis rather than the individual school site. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether actual resource
differences exist among schools serving
primarily black and Hispanic students as
compared to schools serving primarily
white students.
Finally, AOR found that no overwhelming quantitative data exist which
demonstrate the factors contributing to
the differences between the highest- and
lowest-performing schools serving predominantly minority students.
As recommendations, AOR first suggested that policies for improving lowperforming schools serving primarily
black and Hispanic students should
include reducing the size of the school
unit. This could be accomplished either
by designing smaller individual schools
or adopting a "school within a school"
concept.
AOR next recommended that expenditure data be collected so it is possible
to determine per pupil expenditures by
school site. The data to be collected
should be standardized statewide, using
expenditure categories which are easily
understood by the public. The actual
design of the school level data system
should consider input from a group of
local administrator and teacher groups.
School personnel at the school site level
should receive training and assistance
from the school district in order to
ensure that data collection is uniform
and does not pose an excessive burden
on site personnel.
Finally, AOR noted that continued
investigation is needed to assist schools
serving minority students in identifying
the critical factors involved in making
significant improvements in student performance. A number of projects
designed to assist such schools are currently underway. Issues such as teacher
collegiality, community support services, student participation levels, staff
development, partnerships with private
industry and institutions of higher education, decisionmaking models, and
incentives for innovative strategies
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should be considered when examining
schools which are making significant
improvements in minority student
achievement.
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Established and directed by the
Senate Committee on Rules, the Senate
Office of Research (SOR) serves as the
bipartisan, strategic research and planning unit for the Senate. SOR produces
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conferences.
Any Senator or Senate committee
may request SOR's research, briefing
and consulting services. Resulting
reports are not always released to the
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MAJOR PROJECTS:
Regulation vs. Practice:A Review of
the California Department of Food and
Agriculture's Pesticide Registration
Process (February 1990). SOR
reviewed the California Department of
Food and Agriculture's (CDFA) analysis
of pesticide products registered for sale
in 1987. The review indicates severe
problems with the current registration
process, with the following principal
findings:
-numerous pesticide products lacking
adequate warnings for consumers have
been registered for sale in California;
-recommendations by CDFA's scientists questioning the safety of pesticide
products have been repeatedly disregarded over the last four years, and
CDFA scientists have accused non-scientists of altering documents, disregarding policies, and distorting legal mandates; and
-CDFA has adopted policies and
practices circumventing regulatory
requirements that require full testing for
acute health effects of pesticides.
CDFA is charged with protecting
Californians from the toxic properties of
pesticide products. In order to accomplish this task, pesticides must be registered by CDFA before they may be sold
in the state. SOR reviewed CDFA's registration of pesticide products between
March and December 1987. This report
documents that during this time twenty
products were approved for sale without
regard for the recommendations of
CDFA scientists. This number represents 14% of the products evaluated by
CDFA's Medical Toxicology Branch

